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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20030189-CA

JAMES L. ROBISON,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty to one count of issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Juab County, Judge Donald
Eyre presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(2003).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the district court strictly comply with rule 11?
Defendant appeals the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. The district court's denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Norris,
2002 UT App 305, f 6, 57 P.3d 238.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute and rule are relevant to this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999), attached as Addendum A.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, attached as Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
During the summer of 2001, defendant purchased a 2002 GMC % ton truck from
Painter Motors for $40,812.00 (R. 7; 398:21). Defendant twice tried to pay for the truck by
check, but each time the bank dishonored his check (R. 6-7; 398:21). Defendant never made
good on the dishonored checks and did not return the truck to Painter Motors, but rather, sold
it to another party (R. 6, 398:21).
The State charged defendant with two counts of issuing a bad check and one count of
theft by deception (R. 110-11). Defendant and the State reached a plea agreement to one
count of issuing a bad check (R. 242-247, 398). At the plea hearing, however, the parties
disagreed as to whether defendant would plead guilty or no contest (R. 398:3-4). Defendant
wanted to plead no contest to issuing a bad check (R. 398:3-4). The prosecutor said he
would only accept a plea of guilty to issuing a bad check or a plea of no contest to theft by
deception (R. 398:4). The court explained to defendant that there was no difference between
a guilty plea and no contest plea, except for "some ramifications maybe for civil litigation"
(R. 398:7-8). Defendant then decided to plead guilty to one count of issuing a bad check (R.
398:8).
The court asked defendant whether he had reviewed the written statement in advance
of plea with his attorney (R. 398:8-9). Defendant replied that he had (R. 398:9). The court
asked defendant if he had any questions about the statement (R. 398:9). Defendant asked a
question about restitution, which the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor all carefully
answered (R. 398:9-12). The court then reviewed with defendant the constitutional rights he
2

would waive by pleading guilty including: the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the
right to require the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the right to confront and
cross-examine witness, the right to subpoena witnesses, the privilege against selfincrimination, and the right to appeal his conviction (R. 398:13-14). The court then
explained the minimum and maximum sentence of one to fifteen years in prison and a
$10,000 fine (R. 398:14). Defendant asked a question about the minimum sentence and
stated, "You have to understand Your Honor, I've not been in trouble before, Vm not
familiar with this" (R. 398-14-16). The court carefully explained to defendant how
sentencing worked and the roles of the Board of Pardons and Parole and Adult Probation and
Parole (R. 398:14-16). Defendant conferred with his attorney off the record and then told the
court that he understood the maximum penalty (R. 398:16-17).
The court noted that the State had agreed to drop the remaining charges and asked if
there were any other terms to the agreement (R. 398:17). Defense counsel explained that the
State had agreed not to oppose a post-probation motion to reduce the degree of the offense
under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402 and that the State had agreed to concur in the sentencing
recommendation of Adult Parole and Probation (R. 398:17).
Defendant and the court then had the following exchange about whether defendant's
plea was free and voluntary:
JUDGE: Have there been any threats made against you that have induced
you to enter this plea?
DEF:

Well, I guess that comes . . . Well,...
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JUDGE: ^What I want to know, is this plea your free voluntary act? That
you're not acting under any undue coercion or, or force that this,
that this is a, totally on the, totally your free and voluntary act.
DEF:

Well, obviously there's a lot of, I mean, there's obviously a lot of
coercion, Your Honor.

JUDGE: Well, I cannot accept your plea unless it's your free voluntary act,
Mr. Robison.
DEF:

I understand. Just give me a second. No, Your Honor.

JUDGE: Okay. So this is your free voluntary act?
DEF:

I was answering no, that there was no coercion.

(R. 398:19) (alterations in original).
The court then asked defendant to sign the statement in advance of plea (R. 398:20).
Defendant again stated that he was pleading guilty to one count of issuing a bad check (R.
398:20). The prosecutor provided a factual basis for the plea, stating that defendant had
issued a check in exchange for something of value on an account that was closed (R.
398:20). Defendant objected and stated that the account was not closed (R. 398:20). The
court and defendant then held the following exchange:
DEF:

— payment was not, was not honored by the bank but the account
was not closed. I have a letter in my filefromthe institution stating
that it was open.

JUDGE: Okay. You, you did issue a check which was not honored by your
bank. Is that correct?
DEF:

That's correct.

JUDGE: And a, upon notice of it not being honored did you, did you at any
time make that check good?
DEF:

I attempted to, Your Honor, and my bonding company also
attempted to, but we were not able to completely do it.
4

JUDGE: Okay. And a, in exchange for that a car was delivered. Is that
correct? A vehicle was—
DEF:

No. The car was delivered several weeks prior to that.

JUDGE: Well, I mean—
DEF:

There was a vehicle in, a transaction did involve a vehicle.

JUDGE: Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a value in excess of $5000?
DEF:

It did, Your Honor.

JUDGE: The Court finds there's a factual basis, accepts your guilty plea,
finds it was voluntarily and knowingly given with a full
understanding of your constitutional rights.
(R. 398:20-21).
One month after the plea hearing, on November 15,2002, defendant moved pro se to
withdraw his guilty plea (R. 250-52). He claimed that the plea he entered at the hearing was
"entirely different" from the earlier agreement he reached with the prosecutor (R. 251). He
also claimed to have been confused, nervous, and unaware of the ramifications of the new
arrangement (R. 251). On November 26,2002, the court sentenced defendant to a suspended
prison term of one-to-fifteen years and thirty-six months probation (R. 256-60). The court
stayed execution of the sentence at defendant's request, however, so that defendant could
supplement his motion to withdraw (R. 256-60).
By February 7, 2003, defendant hadfiledno additional pleadings nor asked for any
additional time on the stay, so the courtfileda memorandum decision denying his motion to
withdraw his plea (R. 273-75). The court found that the plea colloquy strictly complied with
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 274-75). It also found that "[ajlthough there
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was some initial confusion whether the defendant's plea was going to be a guilty plea or a no
contest plea and the defendant had some questions concerning certain issues,... defendant
entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and with a full understanding of his constitutional
rights" (R. 274). The court entered afinalorder denying the motion to withdraw on March
4, 2003, and defendant filed a timely notice of appeal the same day (R. 279-83).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A plea entered in strict compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, is presumed voluntary. Compliance with rule 11 must be evidenced on the
record at the time the plea is entered, but a court may comply by using both oral colloquy
and a written plea affidavit. If an affidavit is used, the court must find that defendant
read and understood the affidavit and voluntarily signed it.
In the instant case, defendant signed a plea affidavit and the court determined on
the record that defendant read and understood the affidavit. Considering the plea hearing
and plea affidavit together, the court strictly complied with rule 11. Defendant's plea is
therefore presumed knowing and voluntary. Defendant has not rebutted that
presumption.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11;
DEFENDANT'S PLEA IS THEREFORE PRESUMED KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY
Defendant claims that the district court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court should therefore permit him to withdraw his
6

guilty plea. ApltBr. at 5. Specifically, defendant asserts that (1) the district court failed
to clearly explain the elements of the offense, (2) defendant never admitted committing
the offense, (3) there was no clear factual basis for the plea, and (4) the written plea
agreement was not clear or consistent and did not satisfy rule 11. Aplt. Br. at 6.
Defendant's claim is meritless.
A.

Strict compliance with rule 11 creates a presumption that the plea
was knowing and voluntary.

A guilty plea, like a confession, must be based on a knowing and voluntary waiver of
certain constitutional rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). To
ensure that "a defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby understands the consequences
of a decision to plead guilty," Utah adopted rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, t 22, 26 P.3d 203. Rule 11 "squarely places on the trial
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied
with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1312 (Utah 1987). "It
is well established that '[sjtrict compliance with rule 11(e) creates a presumption that the
plea was voluntarily entered.'" Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22 (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44 % 11, 1 P.3d 1108).
Strict compliance with rule 11 must be evident on the record at the time the guilty
plea is entered. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313; State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 19, 69
P.3d 838. "[S]trict compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so long as no
requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the requirement has
been fulfilled." State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1991). In other words, the plea7

taking court may. rely on an oral colloquy with the defendant or on a plea affidavit. Id. at
218 (rejecting notion that trial court must base findings solely on oral colloquy). If an
affidavit is used, however, the record must reflect that defendant understood and voluntarily
signed the affidavit and that omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit were clarified during
the plea colloquy. See Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 19.
B. The district court strictly complied with rule 11 by use of both a written
affidavit and a plea colloquy.
At the plea hearing, the district court held an extensive oral colloquy with defendant
(R. 398). The court also verified that defendant understood his written plea affidavit and
voluntarily signed it (R. 398:8-9). This Court's review of defendant's plea may therefore
include both the oral colloquy and the written affidavit. The colloquy and the affidavit
demonstrate that the court strictly complied with rule 11.
1. Defendant understood the elements of issuing a bad check and that his
plea was an admission of those elements.
Defendant asserts that the court never clearly explained the elements of the crime of
issuing a bad check. Aplt. Br. at 6. Defendant also asserts that he "never did acknowledge,
and has never acknowledged, his guilt with regard to the commission of the acts which were
the elements of the charge to which he entered the guilty plea." Aplt. Br. at 9.
Rule 11(e)(4)(A) requires the court to verify that defendant understands the "nature
and elements of the offense," that "the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt," and that "the plea is an admission of all those
elements." A person commits the crime of issuing a bad check it he (1) issues a check for
8
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and payment was.refused" (R. 246). The prosecutor also provided a similar fact statement
during the plea colloquy, but omitted the knowing element (R. 398:20).
Defendant nevertheless asserts that he "never did acknowledge, and has never
acknowledged, his guilt with regard to the commission of the acts which were the elements
of the charge to which he entered the guilty plea." Aplt. Br. at 9. The record contradicts
defendant's claim. The plea affidavit contained a clear factual basis for the plea and a notice
that by pleading guilty defendant did not dispute those facts (R. 246). The court also held
the following discussion with defendant regarding the factual basis for the crime:
JUDGE: Okay. You, you did issue a check which was not honored by your
bank. Is that correct?
DEF:

That's correct.

JUDGE: And a, upon notice of it not being honored did you, did you at any
time make that check good?
DEF:

I attempted to Your Honor, and my bonding company also
attempted to, but we were not able to completely do it.

JUDGE: Okay. And a, in exchange for that a car was delivered. Is that
correct? A vehicle was—
DEF:

No. The car was delivered several weeks prior to that.

JUDGE: Well, I mean—
DEF:

There was a vehicle in, a transaction did involve a vehicle.

JUDGE: Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a value in excess of $5,000?
DEF:

It did, Your Honor.
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(R. 398:3-8). The court explained to defendant that there really is no difference between a
guilty plea and a no contest plea except for "some ramifications maybe for civil litigation"
(R. 398:7-8). Defendant chose to plead guilty (R. 398:8).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.

Respectfully submitted this*1?

day of January 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
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Matthew D. Bates
Assistant. Attorney General
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Addendum A

' lendurr

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption.
i Jb Any person who issues or passes .-i check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that
is less than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third
degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony

Addendum B

Pudendum B

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for tnal. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early tnal. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found.
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voiuntanly made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the*
nght against compulsory self-incnmination, the right to a speedy public tnal
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon tnal the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction,
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached,
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6

(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.)

